Voting Rights by Armand Derfner
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Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided
that George W. Bush would be President of
the United States, everyone has been talking
about voting but, as with the weather, no one
has done much. Voting is said to be
fundamental to our nation, but until the 2000
elections we didn’t seem to understand how
rickety our election process is.
We know that in our federal system voting
is administered by states, each one having
different systems of casting and counting
votes. But it goes deeper, as we saw in
November and December. Voting is actually
administered by counties (3000 nationwide),
and takes place at precincts (several
hundred thousand) where it is administered
by Volunteer-Managers-for-a-Day (more
than a million all told). The differences we
saw in Florida between how votes are cast,
counted, and miscounted by voters and
officials in different precincts — let alone
different counties — are not news. They can
never be eliminated entirely but in the past
they have been tolerated far too much.
Small wonder that in such a system
ascertaining the will of the people would not
be easy even if everyone were pulling for an
honest deal and a fair count and if we all
shared the same vision of what that meant.
But of course we don’t. Therefore, working
to improve our election system requires two
focuses: (1) streamlining the system across-
the-board, and (2) making the system fair to
all voters and segments of voters.
The federal government has a wide role
to play in all this. Its power derives from
several sources, some of which are: (1) power
to enforce constitutional guarantees, espec-
ially equal protection and due process; (2)
plenary power over federal elections; and
(3) ability to spend money and offer money
to states on certain conditions. The respon-
sibility belongs to the executive branch
directly, as well as in seeking legislation,
and in litigating before the judiciary.
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The federal government should play an
active role in shaping redistricting law to
protect minority voters.
Since the recent release of 2000 census
figures, most governmental units in the
United States are actively engaged in
redrawing their district lines. Time is short.
Every state will have congressional elections
in 2002, and most will also have state legis-
lative elections at the same time. Therefore,
with a few exceptions (such as states that
have only a single U.S. congressman, or
states whose legislative elections do not
take place in 2002), each state will need
three separate state redistricting plans.
Some states also use districts to elect other
statewide officials such as judges or highway
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commissioners. Below the state level,
innumerable cities, counties, school
districts, water districts, and other
governmental units are engaged in the same
process, with the same 2002 elections facing
most of them.
The direct federal role in redistricting is
limited. District lines in each state are
drawn by state bodies, and lawsuits over
such lines are traditionally brought by
private citizens and defended by state
agencies. However, the Justice Department
is armed under sections 2 and 5 of the Voting
Rights Act to oppose racial or other minority
discrimination in districting plans. Both
these sections will be discussed more gener-
ally below, but at this point it is enough to
say that the Department has played and can
play a major role in achieving districting
fairness through active use of section 2 and
section 5.
 Section 2 allows the Justice Department
(as well as any private citizen) to file suit
against any voting practice or procedure
(including a redistricting plan) that has
the purpose or result of discriminating
on account of race. Such suits may be
brought in any state, and in fact have been
brought not only on behalf of black voters
in the South, but also on behalf of His-
panic voters and American Indians.
 Section 5 requires that in certain states
and portions of other states all voting
changes (including redistricting plans)
must be sent to the Justice Department
for “preclearance” before they can be
implemented. This is an expeditious
screening process in which the submit-
ting jurisdiction has the burden of
showing the change does not have a
racially discriminatory purpose and will
not have a discriminatory effect. If this
showing is not made, the Department
“objects” and the change is blocked. The
greatest application of section 5 is in the
South.
Since Baker v. Carr in 1962, the courts have
gone through three generations of redis-
tricting law. In the 1960s there was a drive
for mathematical equality, creating the rule
of one-person one-vote. In the 1970s the
courts began striking down plans that were
found to dilute the votes of minority voters
— sometimes through districts that were
racially gerrymandered, and more often
through using at-large elections to avoid
districting altogether. In the 1990s the
Supreme Court created a new body of
redistricting law designed to protect white
voters.1
The issue in this decade will be how to
reconcile these mandates, and here the role
of the Justice Department is critical. The
Supreme Court cases following Shaw have
developed a somewhat shifting and ill-
defined body of law, mostly in examining
plans drawn before Shaw was decided.2 The
new plans will be the first widespread
efforts to apply the new jurisprudence, and
the cases will likewise be the first to review
a generation of post-Shaw plans.
The question is whether the new plans will
seek to protect minority voters from vote
dilution. The Shaw cases do not end the need
to avoid minority vote dilution, nor do they
bar use of race as a factor in creating district
lines. The most recent North Carolina case
upheld a congressional districting plan that
took account of race in drawing lines to avoid
minority vote dilution. The Court indicated
that taking account of race is likely to be
inevitable, and that it does not invalidate a
plan without evidence that race was the
predominant concern over and above politics
or other “traditional state criteria.”3
The Justice Department should vigorously
bring suits under section 2 and deny
preclearance under section 5 to plans that
dilute minority voters’ votes. Moreover, the
Department should seek to join cases as
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amicus curiae where significant issues under
Shaw arise. This amicus role is not new. The
Department played a crucial role in argu-
ments before the Supreme Court in the
1950s cases that first shaped redistricting
law. So important were these cases that
arguments were presented not only by
Solicitor General Archibald Cox, but also by
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who
chose the Georgia county unit system case
as the occasion for his first and only Supreme
Court argument.4
We are at a crossroads. How districts are
drawn in thousands of city, county, and state
bodies will test whether we mean to include
everyone in our democracy. There is
significant pressure to abandon the quest for
fairness to minority voters. The Department
of Justice needs to lead the defense against
that pressure.
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The Department of Justice should vigor-
ously enforce section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.
The federal government’s most prominent
executive function relating to voting is its
enforcement of section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, which requires preclearance of voting
changes in various states, mostly southern.
The Voting Rights Act, first passed in 1965
and extended several times since then, has
been called the most successful civil rights
law ever passed. It has had at least three
lives. Its first and most electrifying success
was in section 4, which — almost overnight
— ended generations of outright disfran-
chisement of black voters throughout the
South.5,6
It took only a few years for black
registration to swell. Once black voters
could no longer be kept away from the polls,
however, new tactics arose, commonly
grouped under the heading of vote dilution.
And here the genius of section 5 came into
play. Section 5 was a preventive response
to the massive resistance described by
Mississippi Governor J.P. Coleman, who said
that any southern legislature could pass new
laws faster than federal courts could strike
them down. Previous laws had foundered;
southern states simply ran around them by
adopting new schemes. In section 5, Cong-
ress stopped trying to play “catch-up” and
said in effect, “We don’t know what tactics
you will try, but we know you will try
something and when you do we will be ready
for you ahead of time.”
Thus section 5 created a novel procedure
by which any voting change in a “covered”
jurisdiction7 was blocked and could only be
put into effect if the jurisdiction showed the
change had no discriminatory purpose or
effect. Thus, the burden was shifted from the
voter to the jurisdiction in two ways:
procedurally, because the preclearance
requirement was automatic so the juris-
diction had to make the necessary showing
without anyone having to file a suit, and
substantively, because the jurisdiction had
the burden of proving non-discrimination
rather than the voter having to prove the
opposite.8
Section 5 has been an extraordinarily
successful prophylactic. It has been applied
in numerous types of voting changes,
including such changes as new election
methods, shifting polling places and many
others — but most notably redistricting. In
recent years the number of submissions has
mushroomed, especially after each decennial
census when redistricting plans are
submitted by states, counties, cities, school
boards, hospital and water districts, etc.
Much of the business has involved
redistricting.
In the first several years, most section 5
submissions related to restrictions on the
right to register and vote. That changed
after a 1969 Supreme Court decision that
brought within the ambit of section 5 any
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change that could affect a person’s vote in
the slightest, and that recognized that a voter
could be injured by vote dilution as well as
by outright denial.9 Therafter the number
of submissions mushroomed, and vote
dilution as a concern came to the forefront.
It is no exaggeration to say that the admin-
istrative process of section 5 and the
presence of an agency developing expertise
helped rapidly develop a jurisprudence of
vote dilution.
Section 5 has not only blocked outright
efforts to discriminate; it has helped ensure
that jurisdictions making voting changes pay
close attention to ensure fairness. It plays a
fundamental role in preventing vote di-
lution, and the Department of Justice must
continue to enforce it vigorously in line with
its important purposes.
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The Department of Justice should prepare
for 2007.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
originally passed for 5 years, has been
extended in 1970, 1975, and 1982, the most
recent time for a period of 25 years through
the year 2007. What will happen in 2007?
Each time section 5 has come up for
expiration or renewal, there have been those
who said it was no longer needed and should
be ended. Although the burden of compli-
ance by covered jurisdictions is not great,
the concept of singling out some states for a
special procedure has created strong pres-
sures against its continuation. In 1982, these
pressures were overcome by presentation of
an extensive record in hearings before U.S.
House and Senate Committees of continued
abuses necessitating extension. A devas-
tating cartoon in a Birmingham newspaper
showed a herd of sheep in the foreground
with a pack of wolves just beyond, while the
shepherd tells the guard dog, “You’ve done
a good job; I guess we won’t be needing you
any more.”
It is too early to tell now whether section
5 should be extended again or not when 2007
arrives. Two things need to be done, though.
First, of course, the Department of Justice
needs to be keeping a careful record as it
administers the statute. Second, no matter
what happens in 2007, vote dilution will not
have ended, nor will the difficulty of using
the court system to combat vote dilution.
Therefore, if there are valid arguments in
2007 against simply extending section 5,
there needs to be something in place as a
substitute weapon again vote dilution. Those
who expect to advocate an end to section 5
in 2007 will be called on to tell us what will
replace it, and it is not too early to begin
developing a permanent and universal
system today. The Department of Justice
should do so.
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The Justice Department should litigate
vigorously under section 2.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act came
about because of an aberrant decision by the
Supreme Court in the City of Mobile case.10
In that case, the Court turned its back on its
own jurisprudence and held that vote
dilution could not be proved except by
specific proof of discriminatory intent.11
Editorial writers around the country were
properly brutal in ridiculing the Court’s
opinion. One editorial, referring to the fact
that the Mobile plan was more than a century
old, said, “It would be a good trick to
subpoena the legislators from their graves.”
Congress likewise was moved to action.
Because the Supreme Court’s straitjacketed
interpretation of the 14th and 15th
Amendments could not be changed by
Congress, that body instead executed its
constitutional authority to enforce voting
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rights by amending section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. That section, which had
originally followed the language of the 15th
Amendment, was now amended to include
an explicit “results” test, which remains in
the statute today.12
As discussed above, the Justice Depart-
ment has filed suit under section 2 in a
number of redistricting cases, and it is
recommended that this activity should
increase. However, it is not only districting
cases that call for section 2 treatment.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bush v. Gore creates a new mandate for
applying section 2. That mandate will be
discussed below in connection with the
discussion of that case.
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The Department of Justice should initiate
litigation under other voting rights statutes.
In 1939, then-Attorney General Frank
Murphy asked attorneys in the Department
of Justice to examine whether there was any
civil rights enforcement authority in exist-
ing federal law. This led to the revival of
several long-dormant Reconstruction-era
statutes, which were used to bring criminal
civil rights prosecutions like the Screws case
and later the Neshoba County, Mississippi,
murders.
Today it is appropriate again to look at
the U.S. Code for statutory authority that
the Department of Justice may use to seek
voting rights and voter equality.
Of course there is section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, which bars voting practices that
discriminate on account of race in purpose
or result. This section has been used in many
situations to attack practices that are “fair
in form but discriminatory in operation” —
like the fabled offer of milk to the stork and
the fox.13
A possible list of other federal statutes
would include two sections of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, one section of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, and one section of the National
Voter Registration Act:
 Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(A), enacts what was
known as the “freezing principle,” by
providing that no state or local official
may apply differential standards or
procedures in determining voter qualifi-
cations.
  Another subsection of section 101, 42
U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(B), enacts a “mater-
iality” rule in providing that no one may
be prevented from voting because of an
error or omission that is not material in
determining the voter’s qualifications.
  Section 10(a) of the Voting Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1973i(a), makes it illegal to
fail or refuse to permit any qualified
person to vote.
  Various portions of section 8 of the Na-
tional Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973gg–6, regulate the grounds and
methods of removing voters’ names from
the registration list.
While these sections may not reach as far
as section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in ad-
dressing subtle discrimination that is uni-
form on its face, they are powerful weapons
because the proof requirements are straight-
forward. In effect they provide strict liability.
Moreover, each of them applies to all elec-
tions — federal, state, and local —  except
for the NVRA, which applies only to federal
elections. The Department of Justice has
specific statutory authority to bring suits
under each of these sections.14 Finally, their
potential scope is quite broad because of the
definition of vote or voting:
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The term ‘vote’ or ‘voting’ shall include all
action necessary to make a vote effective
in any primary, special, or general elec-
tion, including, but not limited to,
registration, listing pursuant to [the
Voting rights Act], or other act required
by law prerequisite to voting, casting a
ballot, and having such ballot counted
properly and included in the appropriate
totals of votes cast with respect to
candidates for public or party office and
propositions for which votes are received
in an election.15
Overall, Congress has given the Depart-
ment of Justice broad authority to ensure
that the right to vote is real and fair.16
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The Department of Justice, the Federal
Election Commission, the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights, and other arms of the federal
government should move forward to apply the
lessons learned in the 2000 Presidential elec-
tion.
Just adding to the chorus of opinions about
the 2000 elections is not the purpose here.
Rather the purpose is to see how the
administration can help us make improve-
ments.
The 2000 Presidential election, especially
the events in Florida, taught us that we have
a Model T election system, and also taught
us some subsidiary lessons, including:
 The problems we saw in Florida are
widespread throughout the nation.
 They harm everyone; for example, an es-
timated 2 million Presidential votes
went uncounted because of undervotes
or overvotes.
 They often harm poor and minority vot-
ers disproportionately.
 They violate the Constitution, according
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Attention has focused on the most obvious
category of problem, the different methods
of casting and counting ballots. “Punch-
cards” of various kinds appear to be the
biggest culprits, and their elimination is the
most evident and widespread change taking
place (as recommended by the Federal
Election Commission more than a decade
ago). But that should not be the end of
change.
A host of other problems occurred or are
said to have occurred in Florida. Other kinds
of voting machines had operating or count-
ing problems. Registration lists at polling
places were inaccurate. Lists of voters
disqualified for felony conviction were
inaccurate, causing some voters to be
illegally rejected while others were allowed
to vote despite convictions. Polling place
officials could not reach central offices to
solve disputes about eligibility.
Well, guess what? These problems happen
all the time in American elections, in every
state. They hurt all voters, and all voters
have a stake in devoting the resources to
provide the necessary technology and
training for officials in order to minimize the
error rate.
The problems are aggravated because they
are not necessarily evenly distributed.
Wealth, political partisanship, and race play
parts in how the problems are distributed.
Wealthier counties can better afford to
spend money on modern voting machines.
In Florida, the State created a computer
program that could be accessed by laptop
computers to resolve eligibility disputes on
the spot, but only the wealthier counties
bought them, while poorer counties were left
with the futile (but traditional) method of
trying to use the one available telephone to
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call the always busy central registration
office. In one county registration officials
saw errors on absentee ballot request forms,
and alerted Republicans (but not Democrats)
who then came in and corrected them. At
least 8000 voters, mostly black, were
erroneously disqualified by a process
designed to purge convicted felons (appar-
ently carried out at the polling places on
Election Day rather than well beforehand
as typically required of all purges — with
the voter receiving ample notice and
opportunity to challenge errors).
A number of states have begun to study
their election processes and make legislative
changes. A common problem so far seems to
be an unwillingness to spend the necessary
money. For example, Georgia has passed a
reform bill — with no funding. South
Carolina appointed a commission that
recommended numerous changes — but the
General Assembly skipped the most
important and expensive ones.
Private lawsuits have been brought in
several states, generally seeking reform that
is both across-the-board and seeks to
eliminate inequalities of every kind.
The Supreme Court in the Bush v. Gore
decision appeared to set new standards for
electoral equality. “Having once granted the
right to vote on equal terms, the State may
not by later arbitrary and disparate
treatment, value one person’s vote over that
of another.”
There have been no Supreme Court or
lower court decisions since to explain how
far this rule goes. Specifically, the question
is whether this mandates an equal
opportunity statewide to cast effective
ballots. The Court’s opinion contains some
language giving room for local differences
but not on the basis of wealth. “The question
before the Court is not whether local entities
in the exercise of their expertise may develop
different systems for implementing elec-
tions.” Instead, the Court said, it was the
actions of a state agency — in this case a
court — “with the power to assure uni-
formity” that did not provide equal treat-
ment.17
If the Supreme Court retreats from the
strong equal protection position it took in
Bush v. Gore, that will put the decision into
the class — as a former Justice described an
earlier case — of “a restricted railroad
ticket, good for this day and train only.”18
The federal government can help ensure
that does not happen.
The Department of Justice can and should
participate in litigation to bring about
statewide uniformity in each state. The
pattern is not new. Even after the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected a federal right to
statewide equal education opportunity, ma-
ny states have acted to secure such a right,
either by state legislative action or by state
court decisions. The Department of Justice
has the statutory authority, as explained
above, to press such a litigation program.
In addition, other agencies, such as the
Federal Election Commission19 and the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, have important
information-gathering and -exchange
functions. They can help the states achieve
equality among their voters.
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The administration should seek legislation
to require minimum standards, accompanied
by federal funding if necessary.
The Constitution gives Congress virtually
plenary power over federal elections.
Through exercise of this power Congress in
a practical sense controls all elections,
because the power over federal elections
includes regulation of all elections con-
ducted at the same time and place as the
federal elections — i.e., state offices on the
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same ballot as congressional elections in
November of even-numbered years. States
may theoretically have two election systems,
but the cost is high and would undoubtedly
spur voter revolt.
Whereas the Civil Rights Acts and the
Voting Rights Act were based largely on
Congress’ power to enforce the 14th and 15th
Amendments, other statutes, mainly the
NVRA, have been based on Congress’ power
over federal elections. Congress could act
likewise to ensure minimum standards and
statewide equality in election procedures.
If needed, Congress could also authorize
appropriations to help the states carry out
the new federal equal standards. (Unlike
exercise of the spending power, the states
would not have the choice of ignoring the
substantive provisions of the law by rejecting
the money.) This does not necessarily mean
the same standards in each state, but the
same standards within each state.
State and local control over elections is
an American tradition. The Supreme Court
overrode that tradition. If that decision is
to bring reform rather than simply deciding
one political election, it is time to follow up
with federal legislation to set minimum
standards.
5 
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There has never been a better time to
improve our Model T system that needs so
much improvement. We trail all the world’s
democracies (and many of the dictatorships)
in voting participation. People who are poor
and minority bear the special brunt of the
problems, but everyone pays a heavy price.
The administration can lead the way to
bringing real democracy and a truly
republican form of government to the United
States.
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1 These cases are commonly known as Shaw cases, after the case that first began the
doctrine, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.C. § 630 (1993). The author believes this is a fallacious and
ephemeral jurisprudence, reflecting little more than Justices’ and judges’ attitudes of white
supremacy, ranging from slick to crude. This chapter, though, deals with the world as it is.
2 The first decision in Shaw v. Reno created a cause of action for voters to challenge the
use of race as a factor in redistricting, without requiring a showing of injury or intent to injure.
Later cases have developed the (often-shifting) standards for liability in such cases; the current
rule is essentially that race may be a factor as long as it does not overcome “traditional”
redistricting principles such as incumbent protection. The main examples of cases reviewing
plans drawn after — and in light of — Shaw is the set of North Carolina cases following Shaw
v. Reno itself. There have been three, in which the Supreme Court has reversed the lower
court three straight times. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S.C. § 899 (1996), Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S.C.
§ 541 (1999), Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S.C. § 234 (2000).
3 Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S.C. § 234 (2000).
4 On Jan. 17, 1963, Attorney General Kennedy argued as amicus in Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S.C. § 368 (1963). On four days in Nov. 1963 Solicitor General Cox argued the four cases that
included Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.C. § 533 (1964).
5 The main engine of enfranchisement was the suspension of literacy tests across the South,
enforced by taking registration out of the hands of local registrars where they would not comply.
The 1965 Act also hastened the end of the poll tax in the last few states where it still existed.
After suspension of literacy tests in the South did not bring the world to an end, the experiment
was made permanent and universal when the 1970 extension of the Act ended literacy tests
everywhere.
6 The Voting Rights Act was the fourth modern attempt to end disfranchisement of black
voters. The Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 targeted specific disfranchising schemes
but produced little change. The sweeping approach of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was born
out of frustration at the failure of these earlier efforts.
7 The coverage formula or “trigger” swept in states or parts of states that used literacy
tests and that had low voter turnout rates in 1964, which formed the basis for a presumption
that the literacy tests were discriminating. (All literacy tests nationwide were suspended by
Congress in 1970 and banned permanently in 1975).
8 In fact there have had to be a few suits to enforce section 5, but the only requirement in
such suits is proof that a voting change has occurred. When that is proved, usually a simple
matter, the suit is ended and the change is unenforceable without preclearance.
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9 Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S.C. § 544 (1969).
10 Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.C. § 55 (1980).
11 The leading case ignored by the Supreme Court was White v. Regester, 412 U.S.C. § 755
(1973). The Mobile opinion listed White as a prior consistent case that had held proof of
discriminatory purpose was essential to find at-large elections violate the 14th Amendment.
Plainly, White did no such thing.
12 Ironically, as the 1982 extension of the Voting Rights Act, including section 2, was roaring
down the track to enactment by lopsided votes in both houses of Congress, the Supreme Court
moved to take some of the sting out of the Mobile decision by deciding Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S.C. § 613 (1982). In that case, a majority of the Court struck down at-large elections in
Burke County, Georgia, on evidence that was almost a carbon copy of that which was found
insufficient in Mobile, Alabama. If the New Deal Supreme Court could read the election returns,
this Court could read the editorials.
13 The Aesopian reference and the quotation come from Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.C. § 424 (1971), which invalidated discriminatory tests and
employment requirements under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
14 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d).
15 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(1). The definitions in the other statutes have small wording differences.
16 It is unclear whether the Department of Justice has authority to bring suits to enforce
14th or 15th Amendment rights apart from the specific grants of authority to enforce particular
statutes. While these specific grants of authority would probably cover most suits the
Department might bring, there may well be suits that would not fit, for example, a due process
violation in a procedure that might not fit within the broad definition of voting. If the occasion
arises, the Department should not hesitate to bring suit directly under the 14th or 15th
amendment and have that general authority tested.
17 The issue is reminiscent of the “statewide school funding” cases of the 1970s, which
culminated in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.C. § 1 (1973). In
that case a majority of the Supreme Court rejected claims that the equal protection clause
required states to provide or fund equal education opportunities. Education, like voting, has
been typically administered and funded locally, which means large differences between the
opportunities found in rich versus poor areas. The Supreme Court in Rodriguez found no right
to equal education opportunity, but said voting is different because the equal right to vote
(although not the right to vote itself) is fundamental. Bush v.Gore should also teach us that,
because all state voters compete with each other in statewide elections, the state – which has
the power to assure uniformity — cannot allow voters in one area of the state to buy better
votes.
18 Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S.C. § 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
19 Under 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(10), the Federal Election Commission is specifically directed to
“serve as a national clearinghouse for the compilation and review of procedures with respect
to the administration of federal elections . . .”
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